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\chapter{3}{Project Set-up}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up}
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\quotation{Of all the things I’ve done, the most vital is coordinating the talents of those who work for us and pointing them towards a certain goal.}{Walt Disney, 1901–1966}
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Few BRT projects share a common origin or startup. In some instances, a certain amount of technical groundwork for a BRT system may precede the championing of the project, thereby adding feasibility and conceptual studies to the political impetus and motivation. Other BRT systems have originated through the drive of a single political champion, only gaining technical support and input once the concept is accepted and approved.\par
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Most BRT projects, however, only truly commence once the political approvals and mandates are in place. The resulting budgetary and legislative support provides the kick start for the project setup, the appointment of the project team, and the commitment to a project program. Giving the structuring and management of the planning phase due consideration at the outset significantly strengthens the BRT project.\par
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This chapter deals with the following topics related to the planning of a BRT project:\par
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\begin{itemize}
\item Setup Process;% @ guide/03-project/00-project-set-up.src: lines 27-28: code points 1-0
\item Legal Basis;% @ guide/03-project/00-project-set-up.src: lines 28-29: code points 1-0
\item Procurement;% @ guide/03-project/00-project-set-up.src: lines 29-30: code points 1-0
\item Planning Team Structure;% @ guide/03-project/00-project-set-up.src: lines 30-31: code points 1-0
\item Timeline and Phasing;% @ guide/03-project/00-project-set-up.src: lines 31-32: code points 1-0
\item Planning Budget and Financing;% @ guide/03-project/00-project-set-up.src: lines 32-33: code points 1-0
\item Probity and Risk Management;% @ guide/03-project/00-project-set-up.src: lines 33-34: code points 1-0
\item Avoiding Common Planning Mistakes.% @ guide/03-project/00-project-set-up.src: lines 34-34: code points 1-40
\end{itemize}
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\section{1}{Setup Process}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:setup-process}
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Identification of the need for a BRT system by authorities and the passion of local leaders to improve a city’s public transport both trigger the planning of a BRT system. Although the key components of a BRT project will vary according to the local context and the forces behind it, the basic elements to plan for are similar.\par
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During the project preparation phase, the planning team requires a clear understanding of the local context, specifically the transport-demand analysis. This will result in the selection of appropriate corridors for BRT and the best transport technology to fit the system requirements. This phase also includes the project setup, effectively dealing with securing funding sources, any statutory approvals required for the inception of the project, and the appointment of the planning team and other professionals required to initiate the project. The communications and liaison processes should ideally start in this phase as well.\par
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The operational design and the formulation and adoption of the business plan for the BRT system should precede the physical design of the infrastructure and technology, thereby setting a realistic business and operational structure in place for which to design. The system capacity, the level of priority measures required from the system design elements, such as intersections, signal operations, and station capacity, will thus be based on network information and balance through the financing plan.\par
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This implementation plan should be subjected to continuous evaluations and reviews. The review process must, however, be managed in such a manner that it focuses on adjusting the project as new information is confirmed, without detracting from the goal or the timeline for implementing the system.\par
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A basic checklist illustrating the key components of the planning phase of a new BRT system may be a useful tool at the outset of the project (Figure 3.1), but should not be considered standard for all projects or exhaustive by any means.\par
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		\fignote{1}{Example of a basic overall checklist, which could be elaborated on to include subcategories of actions, as discussed in some of the sections in this chapter.\label{chapter:project-set-up:figure:example-of-a-basic-overall-checklist-which-could-be-elaborated-on-to-include-subcategories-of-actions-as-discussed-in-some-of-the-sections-in-this-chapter}}{ITDP}
	}
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\section{2}{Legal Basis}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:legal-basis}
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\quotation{When men are pure, laws are useless; when men are corrupt, laws are broken.}{Benjamin Disraeli, British politician, 1804–1881}
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\subsection{1}{Statutory Approval}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:legal-basis:subSection:statutory-approval}
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In most examples, a statutory or legal mandate is required before the BRT project gains recognition or acceptance. Statutory approval signals the potential for the allocation of public funding to the project, thereby also allowing the employment of dedicated staff to work on the project. The actual authorization process will vary depending on the local, provincial, and national legislation and delegations. Despite the efforts of a political champion or support group, several steps may still be required to formalize the project. It is only once this legal authorization is in place that the actual forming of a project team, the development of a work plan, the drafting of a project budget, and the full financing of the BRT planning project can commence.\par
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Maintaining an open and transparent process throughout is fundamental to the success of the project. If the project is not implemented in an entirely legitimate and pluralistic manner, long-term public and political support can be undermined. If the proper statutory authorization processes are not followed, opponents of the project could find easy ways to stop the project. The proper legal mandate will also serve to establish the BRT project as a citywide priority across all levels of administration.\par
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Beyond an initial mandate to begin the planning process, other approvals or authorizations may also be required. These authorizations may include the establishment of a special BRT unit or the transformation of an existing agency, the approval of the project budget or loans, and the adaptation or promulgation of legislation and policies regarding the funding, implementation, and operation of the BRT. As most of these approvals may require formal political and administrative processes, this phase of the project could take considerable time and effort. It is best to identify these formal requirements at the outset of the planning process. Although it is advised to make use of existing legal frameworks rather than depending on radical changes to facilitate the project, some projects may require the establishment of an adequate legal framework to structure the BRT implementation.\par
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\subsection{2}{Context within Existing Legislation and Policies}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:legal-basis:subSection:context-within-existing-legislation-and-policies}
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The vision of the new public transport system should be in accordance with the intent and objectives of existing legislation and policies. A lack of consistency in this regard will provide detractors of the system the opportunity to legally delay or block the initiative. It is therefore possible that the BRT concept may require some amendments or additions to existing legislation and policies before it can be fully endorsed and implemented.\par
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		\img{\hsize}{project-preparation/assets/9c4439b23da3e1918044a347631d4d85f27c13f6.png}
		\fignote{2}{BRT plan in the context of existing policies.\label{chapter:project-set-up:figure:brt-plan-in-the-context-of-existing-policies}}{HHO Africa Infrastructure Engineers.}
	}
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While BRT itself may not be explicitly noted in an existing transport master plan, stated objectives to improve public transport are most likely present. Drawing a connection between the new vision and the master plan is worthwhile to ensure overall integration of the new system with the existing direction of the city’s transport plan. If improved public transport is not a stated objective within the master plan, or if BRT will somehow contradict existing objectives, then a review of the master plan may be in order.\par
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Likewise, economic development, environmental authorizations, and land use plans should be examined for consistency with the proposed initiative. Typically, the reduction in congestion associated with a new public transport system will directly connect economic objectives to the BRT project. Existing land use plans should reference transit-oriented development (TOD) and\slash{}or the densification of residential and commercial sites along key corridors. Such references would be consistent with the objectives of a BRT initiative. Land use and environmental policies should be adapted to incorporate the concept of mass public transit. This must occur as an early priority in the project to minimize later delays for approval processes.\par
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Making use of international or donor funding may require the need to amend local financial legislation or policies to allow for the incorporation of this funding in existing budget structures, or, in some cases, the protection of this funding by setting up alternative budget-management structures to protect the funding from being used for purposes other than the planning of a BRT system.\par
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\section{3}{Procurement}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:procurement}
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\quotation{Opportunity arises for the prepared mind.}{Louis Pasteur, chemist and microbiologist, 1822–1895}
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Once the commitment to the BRT project has been established through the political and statutory processes, the procurement of the technical and professional services for the project planning must commence. This procurement process will vary depending on the local protocols and the dictates of the funding sources. However, a transparent and legal process is not negotiable.\par
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\subsection{1}{Tendering and Contract Documentation}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:procurement:subSection:tendering-and-contract-documentation}
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Often, the first step in any competitive tendering process is to issue a call for Expression of Interest (EOI). The EOI document basically requests that all firms and individuals interested in bidding on the project submit a document stating their interest. The EOI should be distributed as widely as possible to all potential consultants and firms. Since many consultants may have other commitments or interests, not all targeted firms will likely respond. The most knowledgeable consultants tend to gravitate to the projects with the best chance for success, and will need to be convinced that a particular project is worthwhile for them to invest the resources required for a bidding process. Simply sending out the EOI will generally not be sufficient, but this does remain a critical part of the process.\par
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Furthermore, the EOI aids the relevant officials in developing a shortlist of potential consultants who may then be called on to submit more detailed proposals. The EOI process permits a wide range of consultants to extend their interest without the necessity of a lengthy and costly formal proposal.\par
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The EOI document is usually basic and brief in composition, without unduly detailed contents. Any background information on the relevant city or the potential system concept may be available separately. Authorities should carefully consider the content provided, as this may prejudice quality teams against making a submission or offer undue guidance to teams, thereby stifling potential inventive approaches to the planning process.\par
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Expressions of Interest should focus on gaining a clear understanding of the individual professionals in a team, rather than general information on the bidding companies, as a team consisting of a group of key, appropriately experienced individuals will benefit the planning process more than teams of generalist professionals in the related fields such as infrastructure or transportation. The EOI should be structured to gain maximum information on the key experts, rather than the track record of the firm.\par
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As BRT has grown in popularity, the number of self-proclaimed BRT experts has also grown, and as much additional research as possible should be done into the qualifications of the specific team being proposed. The managing authority may even resort to interviewing some previous clients of the key consultants, establishing the reputation of the team members on earlier relevant projects. The international community of true BRT experts is unfortunately still very small. This does, however, simplify the process of vetting the submissions of a team submitting an EOI.\par
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No specific principle exists on the number of teams to be invited to submit a formal tender from the EOI process. Although a large number of tenders may require a more complex evaluation process, this may offer the potential for a highly competitive process. Generally, the preference is to have only a manageable number of submissions to evaluate, limiting the effort and time associated with this phase of the process. Furthermore, requesting proposals from individuals and firms with limited or no experience, and with no chance of meeting the technical criteria required, can place undue strain on the authorities and the applicants. Thus, creating a shortlist of three to seven teams to ask for detailed proposals or tenders should provide a sufficient level of competition without becoming an unwieldy administrative burden.\par
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The next phase of the contract procurement process may typically involve the development of Terms of Reference (TOR). Whereas the EOI sets a general framework for soliciting professional services, the TOR should detail the full requirements from which the detailed proposal will be developed. The TOR may not necessarily list every detailed action required, but should note the specific products and deliverables required. For example, the TOR may call for the delivery of specific plans, such as operational plans, infrastructure plans, architectural concepts, detailed engineering plans, financial plans, and marketing strategy plans, and will most likely include a detailed description of the requirements of the planning process. A well-crafted TOR will allow for the creative input from the professionals on the way in which these plans or results could be achieved.\par
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The proposed project cost is usually the principal decision-making factor in awarding the project to a professional team. However, the importance of the relevant experience and qualifications of the team should never be ignored in the adjudication process. As most authorities are legally bound to award the contract to the lowest bid, and no mechanism is allowed to prequalify only teams with appropriate experience and technical abilities, the BRT project could suffer from the results of such an appointment.\par
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The particular mechanism by which bid adjudication and award could occur may depend on local legislation. Some authorities are legally bound to a fixed price system. But by introducing some degree of competitive price bidding, the authority will gain a better understanding of the differences between the competing firms or teams. Some cities may use a fixed maximum price or a range of acceptable prices in order to limit bids within the established or available budget. In such cases, all firms may simply bid the maximum amount or the median of the given range. Thus, any preset limits will tend to reduce the competition and may increase the actual costs over that which could be achieved in a truly competitive market.\par
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An open bidding process could, by comparison, have several benefits. First, without preset limits, firms will tend to lower bids in order to effectively compete with others. Open bidding usually encourages innovation and creativity among the competing firms to find the most cost-effective way in which to deliver a quality plan. Second, the range of bids received provides feedback to the authority on the actual anticipated costs of the required product. With a preset value, firms will potentially adjust the team input levels and the quality applied to the final product in order to achieve the fixed budget. Third, open bidding makes it easier to distinguish between different bids. The likely spread of bid values provides a more discernible gauge to evaluate the proposals.\par
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The risk associated with an open bidding system would be that all the firms bid an amount that exceeds the maximum allocation available to the authorities. This could result in program delay, as the authorities may need to secure additional funding or reconsider the scope of work to align this with the available funding. In some cases, this may even lead to starting the procurement process to align the budget with the project expectations from the start. Authorities may be advised to include a contract clause whereby the bidding process could be cancelled and the process started again from the beginning if the bidding prices are considered too high or not in keeping with a realistic expectation of the quality of the product required. This clause may also be invoked in circumstances where none of the bidding entities are sufficiently qualified to deliver the project products.\par
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		\fignote{3}{Types of procurement pricing methods.\label{chapter:project-set-up:figure:types-of-procurement-pricing-methods}}{ITDP}
	}
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Some authorities may also be able to legally stipulate that bids may be excepted even if the price exceeds the (undisclosed) budget. Bids that exceed an undisclosed maximum may not necessarily be automatically disqualified. These TORs could specify that the bid price is not final, but a consideration along with the technical competence and other key factors in the selection of a winning bidder. An overbid may bring a penalty, but could add value to the end product if paired with key skills and competencies. At this point, the winning bidder may even be requested to submit a similar quality bid, but within the available budget.\par
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In all of the above, it is essential to set quality criteria, as the risk exists that the lowest bid will be awarded, without the team having the expertise or qualifications to deliver the most basic of planning products. This will be elaborated on in section 3.8.\par
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The decision-making process for both the EOI and the TOR must be confirmed and generally known before the procurement process starts. Ideally, the evaluation criteria should be created in an open and transparent manner, with input from a variety of sources, including contract or legal input to ensure that best procurement practices are followed and technical specialists to evaluate the content of the bid and the team experience. Placing the full decision-making control on one individual could create an unfavorable impression of the process and the project.\par
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Clear and consistent decision making could benefit from a quantitative scoring system, while a process that favors only qualitative evaluations can be vulnerable to mismanagement. Should the evaluation criteria or decision-making process be considered questionable or objectionable by the unsuccessful teams, legal challenges could be lodged that would severely impact the project development.\par
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As there is no commonly accepted definition of BRT and projects associated with the concept of BRT can vary significantly, it may be necessary to further qualify the type of BRT experience being sought, to ensure that the team with the most appropriate experience and qualifications is selected. Equally, the selection of a team or individuals that have sufficient BRT experience must be combined with clear local knowledge and understanding. This may be particularly useful in an example where the BRT system being planned is likely to require the restructuring of existing public transport routes, as opposed to a system that does not plan to alter existing routes, or in a local context with particular political challenges.\par
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Despite the best efforts to clearly articulate the project objectives in the professional contracts, misunderstandings can arise. In such cases, consultants may work in a project direction that differs from the intent of the project initiators. By phasing the professional input, such misunderstandings can be corrected before a large amount of work is done. The phase approach essentially requires that consultants obtain approval from the relevant authorities prior to progressing to the next phase of the project. Rather than waiting until the final report is submitted to review the planning project, officials review intermediate findings and give their approval (or not!). Such project milestones should be explicitly stated in the professional contract or agreement at the time of procurement and appointment.\par
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The above scenarios can be avoided by maintaining a close dialogue and working relationship with the consultant team and the relevant officials. Weekly, or even daily, engagements will continuously confirm the project’s direction and allow for adjustments as circumstances require. As an alternative, and particularly in cases where the local authority has very limited in-house resources, a separate team of process managers could be hired to act as agents in this regular engagement process.\par
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\section{4}{Planning Team Structure}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:planning-team-structure}
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\quotation{The strength of the team is each individual member. The strength of each member is the team.}{Phil Jackson, basketball coach, 1945}
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The planning and establishment of a new public transport system within an existing urban environment is a huge challenge. Although the initial concept may have germinated in the context of existing planning duties, it is advisable to structure, motivate, and select a dedicated BRT team to develop the planning phase of the system. A quality BRT system can only be achieved within the desired time frame through the appointment of a dedicated, full-time team of professionals in a carefully considered employment structure.\par
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\subsection{1}{Team Entity}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:planning-team-structure:subSection:team-entity}
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There are two different philosophies regarding the selection of a development entity for the new public transport initiative. Some cities assign the project to one of the existing agencies, departments, or cost centers with responsibilities related to public transport. These responsibilities may currently be limited to infrastructure, public services, or transport regulation and policies. Related responsibilities could also include finance, air quality and pollution control or other environmental responsibilities. The other philosophy is to create an entirely new organizational entity to plan and implement the BRT system. This new entity may draw upon existing agency staff, but in general would represent an entirely new team.\par
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Each of the two options has its advantages. Utilizing an existing agency means that the development team would be familiar with the current public transport situation. The existing relationship between the agency and transport operators could also be advantageous if a history of trust and cooperation is present. Furthermore, by not creating a new entity, existing groups should not experience professional territorial conflicts. Any newly formed BRT organization may have overlapping responsibilities with the existing agencies, resulting in duplication that may cause confusion, administrative conflict, and ineffective use of resources.\par
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An entirely new organization offers the advantage of bringing a new perspective to the local public transport system, whereas existing agencies may be too involved with the current context to take the lead on a new initiative. In some cases, the existing agencies may be held accountable for the existing poor quality or lack of efficient public transport in a city. An entirely new entity will not be as susceptible to the constraints of existing customs, biases, and processes. Additionally, the skills to deliver a successful BRT system can be quite different from the skills required to regulate conventional public services. BRT development tends to be significantly more customer orientated and more entrepreneurial in nature. Some cities find that a dramatic improvement to the public transport system can only be achieved through the efforts of a completely new structure or entity.\par
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Some cities may decide to defer the final choice of agency supervision for a new system until later in the BRT development process, and employ a temporary, ad hoc team for the oversight of the BRT planning phase. The decision on the eventual organizational structure can then be determined through the planning process itself. At the outset, a decision can be made that the planning team will essentially be disbanded once the work is completed and the system is fully operational.\par
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There are examples of each type of approach. São Paulo, Brazil, and Santiago, Chile, developed their new BRT efforts through existing organizations. São Paulo’s Interligado system was coordinated by the secretary of transportation, with the participation of the bus authority (SP-Trans) and the traffic authority (Institute of Traffic Engineering). São Paulo’s organizational design was likely influenced by the fact that Interligado was a priority project of the mayor and a strong institution already existed.\par
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Santiago created a BRT project office within the national Ministry of Transportation. This office coordinated efforts of the other contributing organizations, such as the Secretary of Transport Planning (SECTRA), which was responsible for the technical aspects of the BRT system development. Santiago also formed a project committee consisting of cabinet-level officials and other key leaders, including the Ministry of Housing, Ministry of Finance, and the president of the Santiago Metro. Santiago’s BRT planning team structure reflects the strong nature of central government institutions in overall decision making.\par
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In contrast, Bogotá, Colombia; Lima, Peru; and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, have all created new entities to develop their systems. From the outset, Bogotá created a project office that reported directly to the mayor. This project office also coordinated efforts from other city agencies, and eventually became the formal oversight agency for the implementation and operational management of the TransMilenio system. Other Colombian cities have followed the same model, particularly due to the fact that national legislation in Colombia makes a specialized agency compulsory in order to receive national grants. In a similar manner, Lima has also created a special BRT project office, which has now transformed itself into a city agency called PROTRANSPORTE.\par
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Due consideration should be given to the fact that the most ambitious BRT plans have emanated from newly created project offices or agencies. Bogotá and other Colombian cities stand out as high-quality BRT systems. By contrast, the São Paulo and Santiago systems are possibly further from being considered full BRT, especially when compared to systems that have been developed from a new institutional perspective. Thus, newly created entities may have an advantage in terms of being able to go well beyond established thinking and develop a superior quality public transport system.\par
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In South Africa, a variation of the above has been employed, where new departments have been created within existing municipal structures, complemented by strong professional teams. The level of rollout of the individual systems in the major cities in South Africa will still have to be evaluated over time to understand the level of success in this methodology.\par
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\subsection{2}{Team Members}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:planning-team-structure:subSection:team-members}
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Through the process of initial motivation and approval for the BRT system and the start-up phases of the project, the number of dedicated team members could vary, but should generally be relatively small. The initial team should likely have a flat structure, where each individual carries sole responsibility for a function. Unless a concerted restructuring process occurs, this initial team would then form the basic structure for the future BRT team.\par
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Although it may be feasible and more advantageous for the relevant authority to outsource some of the functions or actions to consultants, the technical competence and commitment of the in-house team are crucial to ensuring the appropriate levels of and time frame for decision making.\par
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It is widely assumed that the core team members should focus predominantly on large budget items during the start-up and planning phases, such as infrastructure and vehicle specification. This assumption is supported by the fact that these items generally have the longest implementation or manufacturing lead times. However, ignoring the operational and system planning at this stage will result in the infrastructure team’s working in isolation from the future operational requirements, or being forced to also assume the role of operational and system planners.\par
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The natural tendency to populate the team with engineers, as engineers usually lead transport projects, has merit in terms of their ability to formulate and motivate the original concepts. True value is added by bringing on board team members that are proficient in liaising with public officials, politicians, corporations, various players in the transport industry, media, and affected groups.\par
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The ability of the team to communicate, be innovative, and formulate strategic interventions will be central to the success of the project. As with all new interventions that would change and challenge the status quo in the urban environment, the success of the team may lie with individuals who relish the challenge, are passionate about public transport, and are not risk averse!\par
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\ifxetex
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\else
	{  % group required to avoid fignote settings escaping
		\img{\hsize}{project-preparation/assets/935593c0c0b10aa5d57a02fb8e5f18840467d8e0.jpeg}
		\fignote{4}{Typical BRT team structure and components.\label{chapter:project-set-up:figure:typical-brt-team-structure-and-components}}{ITDP}
	}
\fi

Special care should be taken when selecting the project coordinator or executive. This individual should have well-developed management and communications skills, extensive experience in the creation and consolidation of new concepts, and must have a close and positive working relationship with the project champion. Although it would be advisable and advantageous for the project executive to have a keen understanding of the concepts and execution of public transport systems, it is essential that the project executive is focused on the management and coordination of the project and the project team. Depending on the project executive to fulfill key technical functions of the project will detract from the impetus of the project in a wider context.\par
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As BRT is growing from a relatively new concept to an accepted contribution to public transport on six continents, more information sharing and technical training opportunities are available. This is widening the general knowledge base and the number of appropriately trained professionals, thereby allowing the further population of the BRT project teams.\par
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Once the BRT concept is adopted and the initial planning phase has commenced, the project champion and project executive should target a more appropriately staffed team to better deal with the fast number of work streams and targets to be achieved for the successful planning and implementation of the BRT system.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-team-structure.src: lines 129-132: code points 1-7

Careful attention should be paid to the continued training of in-house project teams, to keep up with the knowledge and implementation experience gained by private consultants who are more likely to work on different BRT projects in their careers. Opportunities for knowledge transfer between consultants and officials should be facilitated.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-team-structure.src: lines 134-137: code points 1-36

\subsection{3}{Consultants}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:planning-team-structure:subSection:consultants}
% @ guide/03-project/planning-team-structure.src: lines 139-208: code points 1-74

\highlight{Appropriate Role of Consultants}\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-team-structure.src: lines 142-142: code points 1-44

The appointment of consultants on a BRT project could be a cost-effective way of gaining key technical experience, if managed appropriately. The skills offered by consultants who have already been involved in, or, more important, responsible for the implementation of successful BRT projects elsewhere, will benefit the project and in-house team without the cost implications associated with full-time employees within the organization or local authority.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-team-structure.src: lines 144-148: code points 1-43

Perhaps more important, consultants assist in avoiding the pitfall of needlessly reinventing lessons already learned elsewhere. International consultants with significant BRT experience can help smooth the path from planning to implementation. It is highly likely that such consultants have experienced or witnessed firsthand many of the problems facing the local team, and can therefore propose and plan for effective solutions. A local team working in conjunction with experienced international professionals can ideally result in a combination of world best practices and local context.\par
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In looking closely at recent BRT projects, the positive influence of consulting expertise from previous successful projects is noticeable. With Curitiba’s early success in BRT, Brazilian consultants were particularly involved with the subsequent initiatives in Quito and Bogotá. To this day, Brazilian consultants are closely tied to several other initiatives, including BRT projects in Cali, Pereira, and Cartagena, Colombia; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; and Johannesburg, South Africa. Subsequently, Bogotá’s highly acclaimed success has boosted the careers of those associated with TransMilenio. These consultants have been involved in a wide range of initiatives, including projects in Cape Town, South Africa; Lagos, Nigeria; Guatemala City, Guatemala; Lima, Peru; Mexico City; and Santiago. Consultancies from more developed nations have also made their impact, with consultants from the United States and Spain making substantive contributions to projects such as those in Bogotá and Lima. Thus, a BRT project may not only enrich a city with a new and efficient public transport system, it may also spawn a new local service industry catering to the exportation of BRT expertise. This is currently evident in South Africa, where several other cities are now benefiting from the BRT lessons learned in the inaugural projects in Johannesburg and Cape Town.\par
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A city should not become overdependent on international consultants. The local context is still best realized by local staff with a fully staffed agency, or with the support of local consultants. The responsibility for key decision making must ultimately still rest with local officials. Although this is usually the protocol embedded in the existing statutory processes, it also adds to the depth and value attached to these key decisions by the public and other stakeholders.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-team-structure.src: lines 171-175: code points 1-57

Consultants are one of several valuable resources that lead to knowledge sharing. A prudent strategy could involve building the capacity of the local staff while simultaneously making selective use of consulting professionals. Local consultants can gain international best-practice knowledge and experience working with international experts, absorbing this knowledge to apply in the local context, and contributing to the capacity of local staff. This not only shares existing knowledge of BRT, but adds to the international knowledge base, as local context leads to alternative solutions and applications of the core principles of BRT.\par
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\highlight{Consultant Selection and Appointment}\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-team-structure.src: lines 186-186: code points 1-49

While some cities have developed well-designed systems without significant assistance from outside consultants, many cities find it advantageous to at least partially make use of people with previous BRT experience. However, procuring consultant services can be difficult for authorities with limited reference to the BRT experience available in the form of international consultants. There is often a bewildering number of people who claim to have BRT experience. Given the vast variety of BRT definitions and experiences, the perspectives and abilities of the consultants can differ greatly. Thus, establishing a rational process for evaluating potential consultants can help ensure that governing authorities find and appoint the most appropriate and professional members to the team. The appointment and selection of the most appropriate consultants for a particular project adds to the importance of the project, and is also a way in which to avoid planning mistakes (Section 3.8).\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-team-structure.src: lines 188-197: code points 1-64

Consultant selection should foremost be characterized by an open and transparent process. Secondly, structuring the process of appointing consultants to be as competitive as possible ensures that the project developers have selected the most qualified team members at the most cost-effective rates. This may not always be the case, however, and particular care should be taken in the technical evaluation of consultants. It is critical that the technical abilities and experience of consultants match the vision and goal of the particular type of BRT system and the local context.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-team-structure.src: lines 199-204: code points 1-56

While designing an open, transparent, and competitive selection process may at first appear to be a time-consuming endeavor, this part of the project planning is fundamental to the future success of the project and, if dealt with correctly, can be relatively easy to implement.\par
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\subsection{4}{Project Management Structure}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:planning-team-structure:subSection:project-management-structure}
% @ guide/03-project/planning-team-structure.src: lines 210-241: code points 1-0

Once the project is officially announced to the public, a clear project management structure should be firmly in place. While pre-project fact-finding activities may be sufficiently conducted with a few staff members and\slash{}or consultants, the formal project should be given a definitive personnel structure at the outset. The specific organizational structure will vary with local circumstances, but in all cases the structure should reflect the importance given to a new public transport system for the city.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-team-structure.src: lines 212-216: code points 1-96

Perhaps most important, the chief political official overseeing the project should be seen as the project champion. In most cases, this position should be held by the local political leader, while the hands-on oversight of the deliverables should be the responsibility of the political representative for transportation.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-team-structure.src: lines 218-220: code points 1-110

This type of direct leadership involvement could ensure that the project remains a political priority throughout the development process. Caution should, however, be taken that the project does not suffer from cross-party political manipulation or the merit of the system be lost through the association with only one political party.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-team-structure.src: lines 222-225: code points 1-25

The management structure of a BRT project will benefit from internal and external advisory committees or teams. The internal advisory committee usually consists of other local authorities or entities with some interest in or interface with the project. The external advisory committee would generally consist of key outside stakeholders, including national government representatives, trade and labor unions, commuter organizations, and local and international technical experts. Formal inclusion of all key stakeholders in the process can promote the necessary buy-in to make the project a reality. Giving voice and ownership roles to the various groups will ideally create a spirit of shared commitment that will carry the project toward implementation.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-team-structure.src: lines 227-234: code points 1-22

The inclusion of related agencies and departments, such as public works, transport, urban planning, finance, environment, and health in the steering committee could ensure cooperation. Furthermore, at some point the support and knowledge of these representatives could prove invaluable. Their inclusion could also limit the risk of future competition for budget allowances or priority, and facilitate interagency cooperation during the implementation of the BRT project.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-team-structure.src: lines 236-241: code points 1-0

\section{5}{Timelines and Phasing}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:timelines-and-phasing}
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 3-185: code points 1-0

\quotation{Even if you are on the right track, you will get run over if you just sit there.}{Will Rogers, humorist, 1879–1935}
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 5-6: code points 1-34

\subsection{1}{Work Plan and Timeline}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:timelines-and-phasing:subSection:work-plan-and-timeline}
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 8-37: code points 1-46

Once a vision is set for the BRT system and an initial team is formed, a detailed work plan and time line focused on achieving the formulated vision will be required. Through a systematic process, both the BRT team and the public will have a better understanding of the scope of the project and the necessary activities and commitments to achieve this goal.\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 10-13: code points 1-48

Invariably, cities underestimate the amount of time required to complete a full BRT plan. A BRT plan can be reasonably completed in twelve to eighteen months, but this time line can easily be longer in more complex and larger cities. However, as experience with BRT planning increases, some cities may be able to greatly reduce the required planning period, particularly when making use of lessons learned and best practices from other teams, and as more general acceptance of the concept of BRT occurs. The January 2006 launch of the Beijing BRT system came after just five months of planning. The actual duration of the planning process will depend substantially on the complexity of the project and on other local conditions.\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 15-22: code points 1-11

Completing the work plan and time line will help ensure that important elements, such as public communication and education, are not inadvertently neglected. Sharing the work plan and time line with politicians, the media and the public could also ensure that all interested and affected parties have a realistic understanding of the progress of the project.\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 24-27: code points 1-45

Despite well-considered planning, the passage of time and unexpected events may necessitate adjustments or amendments to the original work plan and time line. The work plan and time line should be periodically revisited and revised during the planning process. It is worth considering the value of using appropriate software packages to detail the project components so that each step is carefully evaluated from a timing perspective. A detailed time line will also clearly link associated activities and trigger alerts if critical milestones are compromised. Despite the intrinsic value of a detailed work plan and time line, individual stakeholders may still benefit more from a carefully abbreviated representation of these documents, highlighting the salient items relevant to their individual perspectives rather than employing the detailed work plan and time lines in all circumstances.\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 29-37: code points 1-46

\subsection{2}{Project Phases}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:timelines-and-phasing:subSection:project-phases}
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 39-185: code points 1-0

\highlight{Benefits of Project Phasing}\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 42-42: code points 1-40

A BRT can be phased in over several distinct periods or built in a massive single effort. Typically, cities choose to construct a system over a series of phases, necessitated by a combination of several factors:\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 44-47: code points 1-0

\begin{itemize}
\item Financing for the entire system may not be immediately available;% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 47-48: code points 1-0
\item Results from the initial phase can help improve the design in subsequent phases;% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 48-49: code points 1-0
\item The limited number of local construction firms may not be sufficient to construct a system across the entire city;% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 49-50: code points 1-0
\item Phased construction reduces the disruption that the construction process brings to the citywide traffic flows;% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 50-51: code points 1-0
\item Decision makers may want to test the response to the initial BRT system planning before committing to a particular concept or elements thereof for the future rollout.% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 51-51: code points 1-172
\end{itemize}
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 47-51: code points 1-172

The initial vision of the overall BRT system will likely evolve as circumstances change and time lapses. Despite the fact that the evolving nature of the urban landscape means that corridors and concepts may be altered, in general, the overall concept of improved, affordable, and reliable public transport (BRT) will still be valid.\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 53-56: code points 1-20

The factors that may change over the development horizon of the project include:\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 58-59: code points 1-0

\begin{itemize}
\item Demographic changes in population numbers and density;% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 59-60: code points 1-0
\item New property developments that significantly alter travel frequency around major origins and destinations;% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 60-61: code points 1-0
\item Cost factors for both infrastructure and operations;% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 61-62: code points 1-0
\item New vehicle or operational software technologies;% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 62-63: code points 1-0
\item The type and availability of funding sources.% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 63-63: code points 1-51
\end{itemize}
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 59-63: code points 1-51

Additionally, the lessons learned during the first phases of the system will undoubtedly affect future planning and designs. The BRT-development process should be a dynamic one, with constant improvement to best serve the customers in a changing city environment.\par
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In contrast to the above, phased implementation will result in distinct types of operations coexisting, each with different rules, actors, and conditions. A large-scale adaptation of the new system across the majority of the city can reduce the confusion and inconsistencies created by a phased approach. While a large-scale approach is typically unlikely due to physical and budgetary constraints, some small and medium-sized cities may be able to deliver the bulk of their entire network through a carefully planned single phase.\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 69-74: code points 1-13

\highlight{A Whole-System Vision}\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 77-77: code points 1-34

Even when a system is to be built over a series of phases, it is still worthwhile to formulate and adopt a vision for the entire BRT system. Such a vision may consist simply of a route map showing a schematic representation of where all the planned BRT corridors are intended. This enables residents and stakeholders to appreciate the long-term benefits of the planned system, even if personally unaffected by the initial implementation phases.\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 79-83: code points 1-22

Furthermore, the confirmation of a holistic network vision will be seen as a legacy from the existing political administration to future administrations. If the concept of an entire network is firmly entrenched, then there is less likelihood that future administrations will forgo implementation of the full system. This has particular benefit if the initial planning and implementation delivers a reliable and sustainable system.\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 85-89: code points 1-7

The loss of political will is always a risk when moving from one political administration or dispensation to the next. In many instances, the political instincts of the incoming administration are to jettison everything proposed by the previous administration.\par
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A phased approach also should not be an excuse for an overly timid first phase. An extremely limited initial phase may not produce the necessary results to justify further phases. BRT along a single corridor may also not attract sufficient customer numbers to become financially sustainable, thereby causing public uncertainty toward the entire concept. If this is not evaluated in the large context, and the financial model fails in the first phase, the project may lose impetus before a second phase can be planned and implemented. A single-corridor strategy depends heavily on an intense mix and concentration of activities in close proximity to the BRT system. This highly idealized and mostly theoretical set of circumstances typically means that a single corridor cannot achieve sufficient customer flows to be self-supporting. The limited usefulness of a one-corridor system will also be detrimental to the general support for the future system.\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 95-104: code points 1-14

\highlight{Evolution Versus Revolution}\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 107-107: code points 1-40

The critical question is whether to approach a BRT system by a strategy of evolvement (evolution) or intervention (revolution).\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 109-110: code points 1-26

A revolutionary approach implies that the city commits to a bold plan for an entirely new, citywide transport system. This approach depends on a highly motivated project champion with the ability to gain widespread support for a wider vision. A revolutionary approach will implement all aspects of a full BRT system at once.\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 112-115: code points 1-19

An evolutionary approach implies that the city should begin developing its new system slowly, by progressively implementing relatively small projects one at a time, or in basic increments. This approach may only implement a limited system or a number of BRT elements at one time, and is typical of a system with limited political support, or where support for the system is gained with successful implementation, such as was the case with the Rea Vaya and MyCITI systems in South Africa.\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 117-121: code points 1-66

Both Bogotá and Curitiba achieved BRT success through the highly charismatic leaders or champions who developed a revolutionary vision for the systems in these cities. The initial corridors of these two cities were built in only a few years, but were of sufficient size to achieve financial sustainability even at the outset. Bogotá implemented virtually all elements of BRT in the initial phase of the project. Curitiba implemented most of the physical aspects of BRT in the early 1970s, but many of the critical management elements of BRT emerged only gradually.\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 123-128: code points 1-50

In contrast with the above revolutionary approach, Jakarta initiated its BRT project with a limited single corridor only 12.9 kilometers long. The limited nature of the Jakarta system was further exacerbated by the lack of integrated feeder services. Unsurprisingly, ridership on the initial corridor has not met expectations.\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 130-133: code points 1-17

The above examples show the impact the initial vision of system quality and political motivation has on the quality of the ultimate product.\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 135-136: code points 1-39

To an extent, many of the most recent BRT systems have made compromises between system quality and quantity. The amount of resources expended per kilometer will ultimately affect the number of kilometers constructed at any given time. While BRT is generally more cost-effective than other public transport technologies, there are limits to all infrastructure financing. Therefore, it stands to reason that cities that target and develop high-quality systems may be effectively reducing the number of kilometers constructed, specifically over the short and medium term.\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 138-143: code points 1-44

Bogotá and Cape Town represent perhaps the highest quality BRT systems developed to date in the developing world. The clean, modern vehicles, aesthetically pleasing architecture, and use of smart cards all contribute to a system that closely resembles a metro system. To date, Bogotá has completed two project phases and Cape Town only one. In the example of Bogotá, this totals 380 kilometers of busways.\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 145-148: code points 2-84

However, the high quality of the TransMilenio system translates into increased construction costs that limit the speed at which financing can be obtained for the development of the system. The overall length of the system directly affects ridership, since a system’s network of origins and destinations has direct bearing on the usability thereof. It should be considered that a commitment to build a very high-quality system will reduce the speed at which a full network can be constructed.\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 150-154: code points 1-72

In contrast with the aforementioned cities, places such as Santiago, São Paulo, and Seoul, South Korea, are some of the best examples of a more citywide approach to system development. Both Santiago and São Paulo have effectively decided to restructure and reorganize the entire city bus system in one process. The entire network is being bid and concessioned at once. These systems have tended to incorporate more of the existing bus operations into the new system, whereas in Bogotá there is a sharp distinction between the BRT system and the non-BRT system, with the latter characterized by old, poor quality buses and minibuses.\par
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To an extent, the type of BRT found in cities like Santiago, São Paulo, and Seoul may be seen as hybrids between BRT and standard bus services, akin to the definition of a “BRT light” system given in the introductory section of this planning guide. These systems have fairly modest station infrastructure, often incorporate existing buses into the system and as part of the feeder routes, and some even utilize curb-aligned stations, thereby causing buses to be negatively affected by turning mixed traffic. The hybrid systems also make use of fare verification on board the buses, greatly reducing stop efficiency and average vehicle speeds. Another detractor from “BRT light” would be the loss of universal accessibility across the full system when older, existing buses and infrastructure are used as part of a BRT system.\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 163-170: code points 1-79

While the approach taken by cities such as Seoul can be interpreted as a trade-off between quality and quantity, the actual motivation behind this type of BRT planning may be found in the limited sector reform in these cities. Cities such as Bogotá, Curitiba, and Cape Town have benefited from highly motivated political leaders who prioritized public transport. In Curitiba this even resulted in the entire restructuring of the transport system around the customer. While it may require more time to create a full BRT network, the final product will clearly be car-competitive—and more appealing to the widest possible customer base.\par
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Although there are clear politically motivated and technical reasons for each type of BRT system, neither approach is inherently correct or incorrect. Given the limits of financing resources and construction capabilities, there will always be the need to make some form of concession between quality and quantity. Political leaders and local planning officials must decide which type of system will be best suited to the unique political, cultural, social, physical, and economic realities of a given city.\par
% @ guide/03-project/timelines-and-phasing.src: lines 180-185: code points 1-0

\section{6}{Planning Budget and Financing}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:planning-budget-and-financing}
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 3-311: code points 1-119

\quotation{Don’t tell me what you value, show me your budget, and I’ll tell you what you value.}{Joe Biden, vice president of the United States, 1942-}
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 5-6: code points 1-55

\subsection{1}{Budget}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:planning-budget-and-financing:subSection:budget}
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 9-38: code points 1-105

The realistic scope and depth of the BRT planning process is largely determined by the available funding. Notwithstanding available funding, the project planning should initially provide a total system cost based on the full project as detailed in the work plan. This cost estimate must include all the project activities, including payment for resources like staff salaries and professional fees, travel and study tours, communication, and administrative support. Although some cost items may be embedded in existing staffing structures or administrative functions, all elements should be itemized and the funding sources nominated.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 11-17: code points 1-10

The cost estimate for the planning phase must also allow for escalation or inflationary trends, as this phase of the project will often run over fiscal years. Projecting costs and compiling budgets is generally susceptible to unexpected or unforeseen changes, thereby necessitating budget adjustments. Thus, it is considered prudent to include a realistic contingency plan. This is generally indicated as a percentage of the total project budget.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 19-23: code points 1-41

Budgets should be as realistic and detailed as possible. Overly optimistic projections will ultimately be compared unfavorably to actual results, thereby tarnishing the image of the project from the initial stages.\par
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BRT planning costs have historically shown considerable variation, depending on the scope and complexity of the project. Due to the fact that staff salaries or professional fees are usually the largest contributor to the project costs, the budget can vary greatly depending on the staffing and resources model that is used for a particular project.\par
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BRT planning projects generally cost relatively less than other public transport options, and an additional planning budget should be obtained to ensure the most effective planning process. Skimping on the provision of resources for the planning process and rushing the implementation process to adhere to deadlines dictated by political imperatives can prove costly in the long term. Proper planning helps cities avoid basic mistakes that can significantly drive up costs. Section 3.8 of this chapter elaborates on this statement.\par
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\subsection{2}{Funding and Financing Sources}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:planning-budget-and-financing:subSection:funding-and-financing-sources}
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Funding refers to the general provision of monetary resources for a project. Financing refers to the mechanism required to cover the difference between the available funding and the total amount required for the project. Financing may refer particularly to circumstances where there is an additional cost associated with procuring funds (e.g., interest-based loans). In the case of BRT planning, financing is usually not required, and the political commitment to the project is potentially a greater determinant in the decision to undertake the planning process, rather than any fiscal limitations.\par
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Local, provincial, and national entities are the logical starting point for identifying funding sources for BRT planning. However, the cost effectiveness of BRT has also meant that many international sources are supportive of BRT planning efforts.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 50-52: code points 1-39

\highlight{Local, Provincial, and National Funding Sources}\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 55-55: code points 1-60

In some instances, a local municipality may hold sufficient budgetary resources to plan a BRT project without any outside assistance. This is particularly true in scenarios where the municipal leader is firmly committed to a new public transport system.\par
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The viability of self-funded efforts will also depend on the technical capacity of the government bodies charged with the planning and design of the system. If the technical capacity is relatively strong, and many of the staff members already have experience with BRT, a large part of the planning could be accomplished internally. In such cases, the planning costs may be covered through existing operating budgets, thus resulting in nominal planning costs. These types of short-term cost savings often carry significant long-term liabilities.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 61-66: code points 1-12

In cities with limited in-house technical capacity, external and\slash{}or international consulting expertise may be required. In these cases, the higher planning cost may make sole reliance on municipal funding for the planning process more difficult.\par
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In most cases, cities require local, provincial, and national government contributions from the outset of the BRT project. International support organizations often consider the scale of the local contributions as an indicator of the commitment of a city or country to the actual implementation of BRT. Any city would likely accept a free BRT plan, but without any local commitment of funds, there is very little commitment to the delivery of the system. Thus, many external funding sources require a significant local contribution (often half of the budget) as qualifying criteria to receiving international planning funds. Provincial and national commitment could be measured in the same manner.\par
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Additional funding input from provincial and national agencies may be another option that could limit the need for outside funding. In some cities, provincial and national agencies may actually be responsible for BRT planning and implementation. Examples of provincial funding sources that have provided impetus for BRT planning can be found in Bangkok and Jakarta. In Colombia, the national planning agency has played a central role in exporting the TransMilenio concept to other cities, and in the South African context, the national transport authority provides financial and technical support to cities such as Cape Town, Pretoria, and Durban.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 80-86: code points 1-21

The addition of technical experience available with provincial and national agency involvement creates the added advantage of guiding budgetary spending provided by these agencies. It should, however, be expected that additional agency involvement in the project can also imply increased managerial complexity and potential conflict, specifically when the different levels of government are represented by different political parties.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 88-92: code points 1-18

In some instances, the local transport situation can deteriorate to the point where the private sector may take it upon itself to seek a viable alternative. Private sector involvement may stem from local officials essentially abdicating responsibility for managing and promoting public transport. Clearly, private sector involvement will also include some level of self-interest, in which the private sector groups expect the improved public transport system to deliver corporate profits.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 94-98: code points 1-80

Vehicle operating companies may view the BRT system as the principal means to improve their profitability. Operators may also be responding to increased competition from the informal-transport operators of minibuses and vans that are filling a market gap left by poorly organized and managed formal services. The development of BRT in Curitiba is possibly the reason Curitiba is the only major Brazilian city where informal vans have not infringed upon the formal public transport system. This concept is underscored by the consortiums of private operators that have led BRT planning efforts in several cities, including San Salvador, El Salvador, and Santiago.\par
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Another example where private entities may have an interest in BRT development can be found in Manila, where a local property-development company has initiated BRT efforts in districts near business parks owned by the firm. A formal public transport system in the immediate area would create value to the property company through improved property values and better access for employees.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 108-111: code points 1-73

Private manufacturers may also have a vested interest in BRT. An example would be vehicle manufacturers that could benefit from increased sales stemming from new BRT vehicles. Additionally, as in the example of Dhaka, Bangladesh, fuel suppliers may also see an advantage to BRT promotion if their product is likely to be chosen for improved environmental performance. Based on these and similar examples, local authorities may find it beneficial to form alliances with private sector associations that would be mutually beneficial allies in BRT development.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 113-118: code points 1-26

\highlight{International Funding Sources}\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 120-120: code points 1-42

Development banks and international organizations have recognized the successes of BRT. The lack of large capital debts and necessary operational subsidies results in these organizations typically identifying BRT as an option to promote and facilitate.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 122-124: code points 1-43

The plethora of international organizations now interested in BRT means that cities have a healthy supply of funding options. The role of international organization is particularly relevant to the planning process. The mandate of many international organizations revolves around issues such as capacity building, information dissemination, and project facilitation. All of these are directly related to planning. Furthermore, most international planning assistance arrives in the form of grants and not loans. Planning funds, therefore, typically do not carry any additional funding costs.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 126-131: code points 1-52

The international resources often also bring the additional advantage of increasing access to professionals with international BRT experience. An international organization may have a relationship with top BRT consultants, many of whom would not ordinarily be available or affordable to a particular city. A local government within a developing nation may have little knowledge about which international consultant to confer with or engage in an impartial audit of a BRT project. International organizations may be involved in several cities or countries simultaneously, and therefore able to identify and recommend the best-performing consultants for a particular new planning process.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 133-139: code points 1-50

Likewise, some leading experts, both local and international, will not work directly for municipal governments because of potential risks in terms of delict and probity. By contracting directly with international organizations and not the government, the consultant will be more confident in accepting the assignment.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 141-143: code points 1-104

International organizations can also suggest and ensure that local and international consultants work as a united team. As noted earlier in this chapter, local consultants possess critical knowledge of the local context, while international consultants may have greater BRT experience. As BRT is rolled out to more cities and hubs, the local and national knowledge gained is potentially consolidated, thereby offering local consultants a greater role in BRT planning within a country.\par
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The local and international consultants may not work in a complementary manner if each group feels that the other is inadequate, either from lack of BRT experience or the lack of appropriate local knowledge. The presence of a respected international organization, such as a bilateral agency or development bank, could mediate such differences and create a context for team cohesion.\par
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The main disadvantage of involving international funding sources can be the amount of effort required in the application and motivation process. International organizations may require an extensive analysis of the city’s transport history, assurances and commitments from all relevant agencies and departments, calculations and checklists for all mutually targeted benefits, and a detailed framework and time line for targeted goals. While this application process proves valuable in terms of the inadvertent requirement for project preparation, the amount of time and effort involved may not be feasible in the current context of the resources available to the project at the early stages of the process. Furthermore, several such applications may be required before the anticipated support and commitment are secured.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 156-163: code points 1-87

\subsection{3}{Funding and Financing Examples}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:planning-budget-and-financing:subSection:funding-and-financing-examples}
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 165-311: code points 1-119

\highlight{Bogotá}\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 168-168: code points 1-19

As perhaps the premier BRT system in the world today, Bogotá’s TransMilenio benefited from some of the best consulting assistance offered to date. Since few high-quality projects had been completed prior to TransMilenio, Bogotá essentially paid for the development of many groundbreaking concepts in the BRT field. Projects have benefited from Bogotá’s knowledge and experience ever since. The planning costs of new projects, therefore, have had the potential of being significantly reduced due to the efforts of Bogotá.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 170-175: code points 1-10

\ifxetex
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\else
	{  % group required to avoid fignote settings escaping
		\img{\hsize}{project-preparation/assets/cd1b6ed36a091af0cd525a3953cbb0bd317fbcc0.png}
		\fignote{5}{A BRT station in Bogotá.\label{chapter:project-set-up:figure:a-brt-station-in-bogot}}{Karl Fjellstrom, ITDP.}
	}
\fi

In Bogotá, the largest contract was for a management consultant firm (McKinsey) to provide overall project management, as well as to set up TransMilenio SA, the operating authority in charge of the BRT system. McKinsey’s participation was funded by the municipality through an account with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). For almost three years, the municipality of Bogotá held a technical-assistance agreement with UNDP, which the municipality would pay into a UNDP account. These funds would then eventually be applied to international technical assistance. Since these funds were already committed, the municipality simply allocated the money to the BRT project.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 179-185: code points 1-46

The remaining consultant contracts were also supported by municipal funding. The planning, design, and engineering work was paid for largely out of the ongoing budget allocations from Bogotá’s Department of Transportation. This work was contracted to an international planning firm, Steer Davies Gleave. In turn, Steer Davies Gleave subcontracted some of this work to Brazilian experts from the firm Logit. Due to this consulting team’s efforts, the TransMilenio system has proved to be fully self-financing, and an exemplar of BRT planning and implementation. Thus, the large planning expenditures have helped save the city financial resources perpetually.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 187-193: code points 1-41

\highlight{Quito}\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 196-196: code points 1-18

Like Bogotá, Quito used ongoing budget resources to finance all of the BRT planning. However, other than one international UNDP expert brought in during Phase II, all of the planning and design work was done in-house by the planning department of the Municipality of Quito. The costs were much lower than Bogotá’s, and are difficult to define precisely, as they were covered by the normal ongoing budget of the planning department. The total planning costs are estimated to have been approximately US\$300,000.\par
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\ifxetex
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\else
	{  % group required to avoid fignote settings escaping
		\img{\hsize}{project-preparation/assets/03ef81283ff53059033d648b950884c68601db59.png}
		\fignote{6}{Inside a BRT station in Quito.\label{chapter:project-set-up:figure:inside-a-brt-station-in-quito}}{Karl Fjellstrom, ITDP.}
	}
\fi

While Quito represents an admirable effort for a city with limited resources, the exclusive use of in-house staff may have contributed to some of the system’s operating and financial difficulties. On the first BRT corridor, the Trolé line, the selection of electronic trolley bus technology helped minimize the environmental impacts, but this technology undermined the overall cost effectiveness of the system. The use of electric trolley buses and the infrastructure requirements thereof meant that the total corridor cost came to approximately US\$5.1 million per kilometer. This amount represents a cost of nearly US\$4 million more than subsequent corridors that did not utilize electric trolley bus technology. Since the Trolé line has not been entirely self-financing, the corridor has remained in the hands of the public company. However, Quito has since attempted to privatize this corridor.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 207-215: code points 1-71

The two new corridors in Quito have also suffered from operational difficulties, especially with respect to the business structure. The concession contracts given to existing operators for the Ecovía and Central Norte lines have limited municipal control over system quality and effectiveness. Further, since none of Quito’s corridors are integrated with one another, the system offers little in terms of customer convenience. It is possible that many of these problems could have been avoided if the city had solicited input from international BRT experts. Quito is subsequently in the process of reorganizing contractual arrangements along the Ecovía and Central Norte lines.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 217-223: code points 1-41

\highlight{Mexico City}\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 226-226: code points 1-24

Planning for the Mexico City BRT system has attracted considerable international donor support. The total amount spent on system planning is estimated to be more than US\$1 million. The detailed planning work for two BRT corridors in the Federal District and very preliminary analysis in the State of Mexico was financed by a World Bank–sponsored grant from the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). The Federal District used this money to hire local consultants to develop designs in the Insurgentes (Getinsa) and Eje 8 (Eteysa) corridors. The Shell Foundation and the Hewlett Foundation paid for international experts to review the Federal District plans. This international-review process was largely managed by WRI-Embarq’s Center for Sustainable Transport, along with support from ITDP to review pedestrian access issues.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 228-235: code points 1-98

\ifxetex
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	{  % group required to avoid fignote settings escaping
		\img{\hsize}{project-preparation/assets/afb4797eaab94d0f21347d5680e027cea60f457e.png}
		\fignote{7}{At-grade pedestrian access to a BRT station in Mexico City.\label{chapter:project-set-up:figure:at-grade-pedestrian-access-to-a-brt-station-in-mexico-city}}{Karl Fjellstrom, ITDP.}
	}
\fi

The German Technical Corporation (GTZ) funded the State of Mexico’s plans, which were developed by the consulting firm of Cal y Mayor. In turn, ITDP funded international experts to review these plans and to prepare a financing plan for the system. The State of Mexico has also contracted the Jaime Lerner Institute, the organization headed by the former mayor of Curitiba, to develop another pre-feasibility study of the system.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 240-244: code points 1-20

\highlight{Delhi, India}\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 247-247: code points 1-26

In Delhi, approximately US\$500,000 has been spent on planning the Delhi High-Capacity Bus System. The financing for this plan has come from three sources: the Delhi government’s general tax revenues, a grant from USAID to ITDP, and a general grant from the Volvo Foundation to the Indian Institute of Technology’s Transportation Research and Injury Prevention Program (IIT TRIPP). The funds from the Delhi Government (approximately US\$300,000) were used to contract out to IIT TRIPP and several private planning firms.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 249-254: code points 1-6

In the case of Delhi, most of the planning work has focused on operational and detailed engineering design. Little to no initial investment has been made for the purpose of demand analysis. As a result, the planned corridors may well contribute to the further congestion of mixed-traffic lanes without providing substantial time-saving benefits to public transport customers. The so-called cost of this design flaw will manifest in the form of congestion imposed on the mixed traffic, translated to increased fuel consumption and time cost.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 256-261: code points 1-14

\highlight{Jakarta}\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 264-264: code points 1-20

The TransJakarta system in Indonesia was planned with funding from the provincial government (DKI Jakarta). The government contracted three local consulting firms for different elements of the planning phase: Pamintori Cipta, Ernst \& Young, and the University of Indonesia’s Center for Transportation Studies (UI CTS). With supplemental funding from USAID, ITDP has organized a review of the plans produced by international consultants. Additionally, the USAID funds have supported study tours for key staff, work on demand modeling, public relations activities, and NGO efforts to facilitate public participation.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 266-271: code points 1-80

\ifxetex
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		\img{\hsize}{project-preparation/assets/d32a89852d30dd219f4d04eb55281c62e822f669.png}
		\fignote{8}{Even with the system’s challenges, TransJakarta is a great alternative to private vehicles.\label{chapter:project-set-up:figure:even-with-the-systems-challenges-transjakarta-is-a-great-alternative-to-private-vehicles}}{Karl Fjellstrom, ITDP.}
	}
\fi

\highlight{Dar es Salaam, Tanzania}\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 277-277: code points 1-36

Dar es Salaam’s BRT planning efforts have been financed to date through four different sources. The largest share, of approximately US\$1 million, was part of the World Bank loan package known as the Central Roads Corridor Improvement Project. An additional US\$500 was awarded through a UNEP-sponsored GEF project that is being managed by ITDP. This GEF-funded component is focusing on planning of the institutional and business model, capacity building, and non-motorized transport facilities. The municipality of Dar es Salaam contributed an additional US\$600,000 to the two-year planning process. Another US\$100,000 was awarded through a USAID grant that was also managed by ITDP.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 279-285: code points 1-64

Dar es Salaam provides one of the best theoretical examples of funding diversity. By approaching multiple sources, Dar es Salaam is not dependent on a single organization. Further, since different funding sources tend to focus on different project aspects, this funding diversity also brings two other advantages:\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 287-289: code points 1-100

\begin{enumerate}
\item Provides access to multiple sources of consulting expertise;% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 291-292: code points 1-0
\item Ensures all aspects of the planning process are adequately addressed.% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 292-292: code points 1-77
\end{enumerate}
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 291-292: code points 1-77

Building a synergistic package of funding sources should thus be a priority in any funding strategy. It should, however, be noted that this strategy would require a strong and competent management base to coordinate the various funding sources and the associated teams, to maintain a central focus and product goal.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 294-297: code points 1-5

\highlight{China}\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 300-300: code points 1-18

In China, technical support for the first BRT system in Kunming originated from the Swiss government via the Zurich Sister City Project, with matching funds from general municipal government budget revenues. Technical support to Shejiazhuang came from general municipal government budget revenues, with some loan funds from the World Bank. Subsequent technical support to Beijing, Chengdu, Xian, Jinan, Hangzhou, and Kunming stems from the Hewlett Foundation and the Energy Foundation, always with matching municipal funds for project staff and surveying work. The Rockefeller Brothers Fund originally provided technical support in Guangzhou, but more recently the project is being supported through the funding assistance of the Hewlett Foundation.\par
% @ guide/03-project/planning-budget-and-financing.src: lines 302-309: code points 1-19

\ifxetex
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		\img{\hsize}{project-preparation/assets/ee3979489b71bf8ac5059d48f6f99e68adcad16d.png}
		\fignote{9}{The Gangding BRT station during Guangzhou’s evening peak rush hour.\label{chapter:project-set-up:figure:the-gangding-brt-station-during-guangzhous-evening-peak-rush-hour}}{Karl Fjellstrom, ITDP.}
	}
\fi

\section{7}{Probity and Risk Management}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:probity-and-risk-management}
% @ guide/03-project/probity-and-risk-management.src: lines 3-46: code points 1-107

\quotation{Take from a man his reputation for probity, and the more shrewd and clever he is, the more hated and mistrusted he becomes.}{Marcus Tullius Cicero, philosopher and politician, 106 BC–43 BC}
% @ guide/03-project/probity-and-risk-management.src: lines 5-7: code points 1-65

BRT planning and, in particular, implementation projects have considerable political profiles and the potential for massive international, national, and local investment, and are therefore very susceptible to corruption. Various opportunities for corrupt practices could occur from the early planning stages to the operational phases of the project, and at every facet in between. Vigilance and careful planning for probity and risk management should be considered. The potential types of corruption could include anything from financial mismanagement or fraudulent budget practices to misrepresentation of technical ability by consultants during the procurement process.\par
% @ guide/03-project/probity-and-risk-management.src: lines 9-15: code points 1-54

Mismanagement or corrupt practices at any stage of the project have the potential to discourage financial investment and tarnish the image of the system in the minds of potential customers. Corruption could also reflect negatively on the political drivers of the project or any of the team members associated with other aspects of the project.\par
% @ guide/03-project/probity-and-risk-management.src: lines 17-20: code points 1-34

The initial risk-management principles may be implemented by the political driver of the project, the contracting authorities, or the funding sources, but should ideally be addressed by all involved in these early stages. This responsibility most often rests with the national or local authorities responsible for the BRT-planning project, through the various legislative procedures guarding against corruption in government, or through the terms of reference imposed by the funding sources, in particular international development banks and similar institutions. This high level of probity during the legislative and financing phases of the project can then be structured to continue through the project, with risk management built into the other stages as financing rolls out (such as structured budget reporting on a monthly, quarterly, or annual basis), or professional contracting through transparent procurement processes.\par
% @ guide/03-project/probity-and-risk-management.src: lines 22-30: code points 1-88

Furthermore, professional consultant contracts can be written to include penalty and incentive clauses to encourage the required level of professional performance. Such clauses for planning work typically relate to the timely delivery of the contracted product. However, incentives can also be applied to the quality and acceptability of the product. The crafting of incentive language must be carefully phrased, as ill-conceived performance measurement clauses can cause unintended results.\par
% @ guide/03-project/probity-and-risk-management.src: lines 32-36: code points 1-78

Ultimately, the best defense against problems relating to quality and productivity is to work with firms that have a known reputation or record of delivery of quality products. This will result in long-term relationships based on confirmed integrity and trust between the authorities and the professional teams. When risk management becomes a problem, then professionals with long-standing experience and good track records of professional insurance are a preferred option to authorities.\par
% @ guide/03-project/probity-and-risk-management.src: lines 38-42: code points 1-72

The continued review of all aspects of the project is discussed elsewhere in this chapter, but should equally be referenced in the context of risk management. While important, the management team should be alerted to guarding against the potential paralysis that may result from overemphasis of this safeguard.\par
% @ guide/03-project/probity-and-risk-management.src: lines 44-46: code points 1-107

\section{8}{Avoiding Common Planning Mistakes}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:avoiding-common-planning-mistakes}
% @ guide/03-project/avoiding-common-planning-mistakes.src: lines 3-285: code points 1-111

\quotation{Sometimes when you innovate, you make mistakes. It is best to admit them quickly, and get on with improving your other innovations.}{Steve Jobs, cofounder and former CEO of Apple Inc., 1955–2011}
% @ guide/03-project/avoiding-common-planning-mistakes.src: lines 5-7: code points 1-63

At the outset of the project, the planning team should make every effort to observe the lessons learned to date from previous BRT projects. Both successes and failures of previous BRT efforts should be noted. In many ways, the problems and mistakes encountered from past efforts may be even more instructive than the successes. Recognizing and avoiding the most common errors can save a city considerable time and resources.\par
% @ guide/03-project/avoiding-common-planning-mistakes.src: lines 9-13: code points 1-10

Although some of the following lessons regarding the avoidance of planning mistakes have been dealt with earlier in this chapter, it is useful to reflect on the most important elements in a separate discussion.\par
% @ guide/03-project/avoiding-common-planning-mistakes.src: lines 15-16: code points 1-110

It is almost always less costly to get a system right the first time, rather than attempting to correct problems later. Once operator contracts are signed, it becomes more legally and financially challenging to negotiate changes. Attempts to integrate Quito’s three independently operated busway corridors have been thwarted due to the existing contractual arrangements. Likewise, revising the system concept plan while designing the infrastructure can be both physically and financially difficult. In Brisbane, a miscalculation of demand and the use of standard-sized vehicles resulted in severe busway congestion at one major station. The subsequent retrofitting of a passing lane through the station area resulted in an additional cost of US\$11.4 million. This underscores the need for adequate project planning at the outset, and progressive approvals at regular intervals during each phase of the entire project. Although BRT systems are generally the most adaptable of all forms of public transport systems, fundamental changes late in the process can be very costly in terms of both the budget and the program. Fundamental changes could also damage the public perception of the system at critical times.\par
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Bangkok proposed to construct its Phase I BRT system along the Kaset Nawamin corridor specifically because there was no traffic or congestion on the corridor. The lack of demand along the corridor was attractive because it meant that the BRT system would have no effect on mixed-traffic flows. However, at the same time, there was virtually no public transport demand along the corridor either. While building a high-technology BRT system along such a corridor might prove a testing ground for the concept, it would not likely be financially viable. Building a system where it is easy to do so is unlikely to serve the interest of public transport, enhance the image of sustainability in public transport, and raise questions regarding the political or administrative support to the initiative.\par
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The long-term BRT planning in Bangkok has given relatively little consideration to customer convenience. The system calls for all corridors to terminate prior to arriving in the city center. Additionally, the system routing forces most customers to make multiple transfers prior to even arriving at the final stop, which is located outside the key city-center destinations. Once arriving at the periphery of the central area, customers are expected to either transfer to the rail system (which also serves a small number of corridors) or transfer to other options such as taxis.\par
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The initial phase of the Jakarta system and the demonstration phase of the Beijing system both suffered design problems that inhibited the performance of the systems. The litany of initial problems that can be identified in the Jakarta system are as follows:\par
% @ guide/03-project/avoiding-common-planning-mistakes.src: lines 47-50: code points 1-0

\begin{itemize}
\item Existing buses were allowed to continue operating in the mixed-traffic lanes along the busway corridor, resulting in congestion for private vehicles;% @ guide/03-project/avoiding-common-planning-mistakes.src: lines 50-51: code points 1-0
\item Lack of competitive tendering for professional services;% @ guide/03-project/avoiding-common-planning-mistakes.src: lines 51-52: code points 1-0
\item Lack of competitive tendering for the smart card system, resulting in a nonfunctioning fare system;% @ guide/03-project/avoiding-common-planning-mistakes.src: lines 52-53: code points 1-0
\item No feeder services were provided in conjunction with the relatively short Phase I corridor;% @ guide/03-project/avoiding-common-planning-mistakes.src: lines 53-54: code points 1-0
\item A subsequent attempt to integrate the BRT and the existing public transport fares failed due to existing operators not accepting the transfer tickets;% @ guide/03-project/avoiding-common-planning-mistakes.src: lines 54-55: code points 1-0
\item The public procurement of vehicles resulted in vehicles too small for the given demand;% @ guide/03-project/avoiding-common-planning-mistakes.src: lines 55-56: code points 1-0
\item Stations were also too small for the given demand;% @ guide/03-project/avoiding-common-planning-mistakes.src: lines 56-57: code points 1-0
\item Vehicles with only one doorway resulted in slow boarding and alighting times.% @ guide/03-project/avoiding-common-planning-mistakes.src: lines 57-57: code points 1-83
\end{itemize}
% @ guide/03-project/avoiding-common-planning-mistakes.src: lines 50-57: code points 1-83

The problems associated with the Beijing demonstration phase included:\par
% @ guide/03-project/avoiding-common-planning-mistakes.src: lines 59-60: code points 1-0

\begin{itemize}
\item Construction of a BRT facility in a corridor with relatively minimal public transport demand;% @ guide/03-project/avoiding-common-planning-mistakes.src: lines 60-61: code points 1-0
\item The only segment of the corridor that could have benefited from a dedicated busway was the one portion for which no exclusive busway was planned;% @ guide/03-project/avoiding-common-planning-mistakes.src: lines 61-62: code points 1-0
\item Interior-seating design of the vehicles provided space for 1.5 customers, translating to the reality that an 18.5-meter articulated vehicle had approximately the same customer capacity as a standard 12-meter vehicle with optimal interior design;% @ guide/03-project/avoiding-common-planning-mistakes.src: lines 62-63: code points 1-0
\item The 5-meter-wide busways were of generous width for a standard busway, but did not allow for passing width or two lanes.% @ guide/03-project/avoiding-common-planning-mistakes.src: lines 63-63: code points 1-126
\end{itemize}
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Fortunately for both the Jakarta and Beijing efforts, the planning and design of subsequent phases have assisted in reversing or mitigating a large number of the problems listed above. Nevertheless, problems associated with the initial phases of a system can do much to damage the image of the system for future rollout. Thus, cities are encouraged to study the lessons learned elsewhere from the outset of the planning phase.\par
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Perhaps the most serious type of risk to the planning and implementation relates to political continuity. There are numerous projects that have begun in a promising manner, only to stall or collapse due to a lack of political will or a change in leadership. In many cases, cities have expended significant resources in sending delegations on study tours and hiring consultants to develop scoping studies. Cities such as Dhaka, Bangladesh; Shanghai, China; Hyderabad, India; and Pueblo, Mexico, have experienced delays to the planning and implementation of their potentially feasible BRT systems due to several of these reasons.\par
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The rest of this chapter deals with some lessons learned and ways to contribute to the success of planning, designing, and constructing a BRT system.\par
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\subsection{1}{Appointing a Quality Professional Team}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:avoiding-common-planning-mistakes:subSection:appointing-a-quality-professional-team}
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Although BRT planning, design, and implementation is a fast-growing part of international public transport, it is still often a new initiative in many cities. The associated learning curves challenge local teams to gain a good understanding of all aspects of BRT to ensure that they plan for the most appropriate system for the given context and that the resulting infrastructure meets the operational requirements. Therefore, when procuring a professional team, great care should be taken to set the quality requirements of the team at sufficiently high levels to ensure that a suitably qualified team can be appointed. Key personnel must have recent and relevant experience, and if teams want to meet the quality thresholds it might be necessary to recruit personnel internationally.\par
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As much as the planning- and project-management teams require a full understanding of the international best practices of all the components of a BRT system, the team responsible for the implementation and operational phases of the project will equally need the skills to adapt and modify the international principles and to implement designs that meet local standards. As an example, the introduction of BRT lanes at signalized intersections may require the use of the existing traffic-signal policy, which may have been developed without any thought that BRT would one day be implemented. This often requires amendments to policies in close coordination with local policy makers and implementation agencies, and should be flagged early in the planning stage to minimize the impact of the (usually) slow or cumbersome legislative processes on the implementation stages.\par
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International best practices and the appointment of the best possible team should trump the cost of the procurement of the professional teams, as the appointment of inexperienced professionals can cause far larger costs and budget overruns throughout the entire process, not only in the planning stages.\par
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\subsection{2}{Regular Review Processes}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:avoiding-common-planning-mistakes:subSection:regular-review-processes}
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As described earlier in this chapter, planning teams should, from the outset of the project, be made aware of the expectation that regular reviews or engagements for the purpose of auditing or regulating will be required. The concept that a regular review process is required and implemented should be a fundamental part of the entire BRT project, and included in all levels of the project team, from the political champion to the various consultant teams and technical specialists, in a cascading hierarchy.\par
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BRT planning processes include a wide range of technical and decision-making input, and the various work streams should be audited and reviewed by the most knowledgeable authority in the relevant field, to ensure an appropriate review process. The homogenous nature of an individual review process within the larger project will ensure that the interaction is of an appropriate level, and can add true value to both participating parties.\par
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The continuous, regular review of the planning phase of the BRT project will serve to install this way of process value-added in the project team at the outset, and this precedent should then be carried through in each subsequent implementation or operational project phase. Equally, the high level of review of the planning team should continue until this phase is complete. Project managers or authorities should then disseminate historic review data to ensure continuity and a frame of reference for future processes.\par
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The availability of officials and key managers for regular review engagements is critical for an effective and efficient process, and should be scheduled and committed to in advance. The regularity of the review process is a further critical contributing factor to this process. Ideally, weekly engagements on a specifically agreed time and place will be the best approach. The immediate feedback and guidance derived from such regular meetings allows instant incorporation of or adaptation of new information or practical occurrences that impact the planning process.\par
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The various funding providers may also require this review process to ensure that the level of technical input, project progress, and the budget take-up are appropriately matched. This element of the review process will be as critical to the future of the BRT project as any of the technical reviews on the implementation or operational planning of the system.\par
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\subsection{3}{Accurate Budget Calculations}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:avoiding-common-planning-mistakes:subSection:accurate-budget-calculations}
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In BRT projects, the implementation and operating costs comprise a high proportion of the overall cost of a BRT system. An experienced planning team can deliver comprehensive and informed budget projections for these phases of the project. In contrast, the planning stage of a BRT project is often the least budget-hungry phase, while providing the opportunity to create and test the best plan for the future rollout of the entire project. Through the dynamic planning review process discussed earlier, the team can do relatively accurate budget calculations at an early stage of the project, which will drive the funding process, the cash flow predictions, and the general rollout of the rest of the BRT project. An experienced team can start delivering value-engineered implementation initiatives that will support the political drive and continued funding of the project.\par
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Once a BRT system is operational, it needs to operate for many years without failure, as any disruption to the busways and stations will result in major disruptions to public transport services and inconvenience customers. Furthermore, cities can do without adding significant maintenance costs to their already small and underfunded maintenance budgets. This again emphasizes the need for accurate budget calculations at the planning stage of the project, with continued updating of the budget to allow for escalation or improvements resulting from the review process or the dynamics of a city. Chapter 21: Infrastructure Management and Costing contains a model of ITDP’s BRT Cost Calculator.\par
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\subsection{4}{Understanding All Elements of the System}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:avoiding-common-planning-mistakes:subSection:understanding-all-elements-of-the-system}
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Due to the expansive nature of BRT networks, as well as the fact that this is often a new concept introduced into an existing urban environment with the associated challenges, it is likely to be impossible for a city to build an entire BRT network in one phase. It is important for cities to plan the entire integrated public transport network early in the BRT planning stages, as the full system requirements need to be understood before Phase 1 is implemented. The initial phase may typically include infrastructure, such as a terminal building or depot, which will have to be sized and even built in Phase 1 to ensure minimal construction disruption to the operation of Phase 1 and the subsequent public transport services. Equally, decisions such as the type of vehicle fleet to be used or what kind of fare-collection system to utilize will have an impact on almost all other aspects of the implementation and operation of the future BRT phases, but have to be decided on in the planning phase.\par
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This necessity for a comprehensive understanding of the BRT concept, and all the elements in which manifest in a specific system, again emphasizes the need for an experienced, competent team of officials and consultants that can lead the planning phase and, potentially, continue during future phases of the BRT project. The continued participation of at least a number of key officials and members of the project management team will serve as an invaluable reference.\par
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To fully grasp the BRT concept, it is important to study existing operating BRT systems. It is important to speak to people who have been involved in developing working BRT systems, and to ride on the systems. Doing this develops an understanding for how the bus lanes have been located in the roadway, what materials have been used, how these materials accommodate bus loads, what strategies work, and which do not. When using the stations, it is important to note the type of architecture used, materials utilized, weather protection, safety features, and customer space and circulation. Is important to notice how buses dock at stations and what damage has been caused to buses and stations due to inaccurate docking and the docking mechanisms used. Terminal and transfer stations should be visited to understand multiple platform and staff facility requirements. It is also useful to visit a working and functional depot, to understand the design requirements of depots. These are only some of a vast number of details to be studied, evaluated, and made familiar by the planning team for the specific BRT project.\par
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Due to the diverse lessons to be learned from existing systems, any study tour undertaken should not only be conducted to understand what BRT is all about, but also to assess what can be done better, and what is already functioning well.\par
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Small touring parties with specific goals and appointments with key local representatives are more advisable than large groups travelling the system without active engagement with local BRT experts, officials, or operators.\par
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As with all imported technologies, which is often the case with BRT systems, it is important to thoroughly interrogate all aspects of the system design to see whether design assumptions made in other countries hold true in the local context. An example may be in utilizing cost per kilometer for the implementation of bus lanes in South America, which may be very different to the equivalent cost in an African city, due to the use of different construction methods and materials, impact on existing services, geometric design standards, the levels or types of industry transition required, etc.\par
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If possible, an international expert (or someone who has experience in developing and running a BRT system) should be part of the local project planning team to provide firsthand experience. This will avoid unnecessary reinventing of well-established design principles, something that most cities can ill afford in their BRT rollout program.\par
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A BRT network could take between fifteen and twenty-five years for a city to fully develop. Over time, it is likely that technology will change, resulting in amendments to the full system design. On a local scale, BRT operations on a particular corridor may change over time, as land use changes occur and customer travel patterns change from what was originally anticipated. It is therefore essential that the planning phase should allow for flexibility without compromising the concept of BRT. Being aware of these opportunities and planning for these potential shifts will ensure that any BRT system is flexible to technology changes.\par
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\subsection{5}{Integrated Planning}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:avoiding-common-planning-mistakes:subSection:integrated-planning}
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During the planning phases, the team should make use of the opportunity to utilize the BRT project to improve the urban environment. The potential improvements could be as basic as the architectural elements introduced in the design of the station and terminal infrastructure, but could also extend to urban regeneration and the densification of the public transport corridors along which BRT are to be introduced.\par
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The insertion of a busway into a roadway is an opportunity to transform the entire roadway into a linear urban park. BRT customers arrive on foot from all directions and need to be afforded safe access to the system. The station environments need to be attractive and accommodating in order to heighten the customer experience of the system and ensure customer satisfaction, safety, and recurring patronage. The urban design of intersection areas and station precincts is therefore a key consideration, and worthy of detailed planning and design. Other associated elements such as landscaping, non-motorized transport facilities, integrated wayfinding, and enhanced illumination will benefit the urban environment and extend the positive improvements to all users of these spaces, not only BRT customers.\par
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An added benefit of a BRT system to a city that should be recognized and included in the overall planning framework is the potential to attract urban regeneration and densification to the formalized public transport corridors. The improvement to the urban environment will be rewarded by increased investment in the transit node and higher utilization of the BRT system. This continued cycle of improvement should be anticipated and recognized in the early stages of planning and shared with the corresponding teams in the local authority responsible for associated areas of responsibility. In this manner, land use planning can be prepared for densification initiatives, or utility services not directly involved with the BRT infrastructure implementation can budget for improvements necessitated by the potential densification.\par
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No BRT system should be planned in isolation. This chapter has dealt with the political champions of a BRT system, the authorities or officials involved in the planning thereof, the different and diverse teams of professionals required and has referred to the associated disciplines. The end users of the BRT system, customers, future employees, and groups affected by industry transition—basically most citizens of the city—are also considered key stakeholders in this process. Involving the public is an essential element of the integrated planning of a BRT system.\par
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Shortly after the concept of a BRT system has gained political and financial support, the city should appoint a dedicated media-liaison team to ensure that the public is informed and to manage the entire public-engagement process in a structured and strategic manner. This team will also benefit the planning team, by providing the public with background information on the BRT concept, and smooth the way for the required mind-set shift. The management of change in the public domain is often the most challenging element, which starts in the planning phase, continues through the implementation phases in some of the most populated or intensely used parts of a city, and will provide daily information to customers on the operations and use of the system. The media-liaison team should react quickly to negative public comments on the system or during construction, to ensure that public perception of the system remains positive. This team may be tasked with engaging potential detractors or objectors to the system to discuss and explain more clearly the benefits of the system, and to become aware of any negative impacts that the objectors have experienced.\par
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Although local legislation may prescribe certain levels of formal public participation, when new infrastructure is introduced in a city, the BRT team should integrate the project in the public environment through a continued flow of information, and not confuse statutory processes with the value of a truly integrated approach to public-information sharing.\par
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Not only should a BRT system be planned as part of an integrated public transport system, but public transport must form an integrated part of a city on a spatial and functional level. The planning of a new BRT system, or the extension of an existing system along new routes, should be dealt with in an integrated manner involving the various levels and groups of stakeholders. The manner in which the planning team addresses this challenge can fundamentally affect the success of the future BRT system.\par
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\subsection{6}{Conclusion}
\label{volume:project-preparation:chapter:project-set-up:section:avoiding-common-planning-mistakes:subSection:conclusion}
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BRT is more than a busway; it is the establishment of a transformed world-class public transport service that is customer oriented and run on sound economic principles. With this in mind, it is key to underpin the project with sound economic, operational, and transportation input, so that the outcomes maximize the benefit to the customer while also providing a viable business model to transport operators and associated service providers.\par
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With this in mind, it is imperative that all municipalities that embark on developing a BRT system gain a thorough understanding of the way these systems operate before breaking ground on the first infrastructure project. Taking note of the lessons learned internationally will greatly assist cities with their BRT rollouts and ease the burden of what is a very large and challenging, yet rewarding and worthwhile undertaking.\par
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