I have always believed, and I still believe, that whatever good or bad fortune may come our way we can always give it meaning and transform it into something of value.Hermann Hesse, poet and novelist, 1877-1962
There are significant differences in the way in which the most successful BRT systems have been administered in the developed as opposed to lower-income economies. In higher-income economies, the most successful BRT systems have been operated by financially ring-fenced transit authorities or corporate transit service providers with a clear mandate to manage BRT systems as part of overall public transport system operations. There is certainly room for institutional innovation. The high cost recovery ratios possible in BRT systems makes it more likely that BRT services could be contracted out to private operators, which could in theory make a profit and avoid the need for operating subsidies, although to date the relatively small scale of BRT operations as stand-alone services would probably make them unattractive to most private transit service providers. There is also plenty of room for using BRT to better reduce the overall operating losses of a metropolitan public transport system under the existing institutional structures. In either case, institutional reform is certainly not a prerequisite for a successful BRT system in higher-income economies.
In lower-income economies, things are different. The most successful BRT systems in lower-income economies required significant institutional innovation. The best BRTs created new BRT authorities or management companies to fill an administrative vacuum. It was rare that institutions already existed that successfully contracted out and regulated efficient, high-quality, and modern vehicle operations with integrated fleet management, so they had to be created. These new institutions were responsible for initiating a number of significant administrative reforms all at once, and they often stimulated the creation of the first large vehicle operating companies. Additionally, they were often the first to use quality of service contracting and the first vehicle fleets to use integrated fleet management. These new institutions shepherded in solutions to far more serious public transport problems. They were key to resolving problems such as buses being old, poorly maintained, refusing to follow a schedule or stop at designated stops, and the dangerous competition for customers at the curbside that too frequently resulted in pedestrian fatalities. However, these stand-alone BRT authorities did not work out well in all cases. Eventually, they ended up being nearly as sensitive to good political leadership as other administrative forms, and the other administrative forms also proved able to provide a good quality of service. Therefore, it is highly possible that with growing sophistication in the governance of public transport systems in lower-income economies that the next generation of BRT systems will introduce new administrative forms not currently used in these areas. It is also likely that new institutional forms will emerge in lower-income economies, such as the direct contracting of private integrated transit service providers by municipal and state governments, but in new contractual forms. These new contractual forms might build on the institutional achievements of TransMilenio and other successful BRT systems in lower-income economies, while avoiding some of the pitfalls that they ultimately faced.