Take from a man his reputation for probity, and the more shrewd and clever he is, the more hated and mistrusted he becomes.Marcus Tullius Cicero, philosopher and politician, 106 BC–43 BC
BRT planning and, in particular, implementation projects have considerable political profiles and the potential for massive international, national, and local investment, and are therefore very susceptible to corruption. Various opportunities for corrupt practices could occur from the early planning stages to the operational phases of the project, and at every facet in between. Vigilance and careful planning for probity and risk management should be considered. The potential types of corruption could include anything from financial mismanagement or fraudulent budget practices to misrepresentation of technical ability by consultants during the procurement process.
Mismanagement or corrupt practices at any stage of the project have the potential to discourage financial investment and tarnish the image of the system in the minds of potential customers. Corruption could also reflect negatively on the political drivers of the project or any of the team members associated with other aspects of the project.
The initial risk-management principles may be implemented by the political driver of the project, the contracting authorities, or the funding sources, but should ideally be addressed by all involved in these early stages. This responsibility most often rests with the national or local authorities responsible for the BRT-planning project, through the various legislative procedures guarding against corruption in government, or through the terms of reference imposed by the funding sources, in particular international development banks and similar institutions. This high level of probity during the legislative and financing phases of the project can then be structured to continue through the project, with risk management built into the other stages as financing rolls out (such as structured budget reporting on a monthly, quarterly, or annual basis), or professional contracting through transparent procurement processes.
Furthermore, professional consultant contracts can be written to include penalty and incentive clauses to encourage the required level of professional performance. Such clauses for planning work typically relate to the timely delivery of the contracted product. However, incentives can also be applied to the quality and acceptability of the product. The crafting of incentive language must be carefully phrased, as ill-conceived performance measurement clauses can cause unintended results.
Ultimately, the best defense against problems relating to quality and productivity is to work with firms that have a known reputation or record of delivery of quality products. This will result in long-term relationships based on confirmed integrity and trust between the authorities and the professional teams. When risk management becomes a problem, then professionals with long-standing experience and good track records of professional insurance are a preferred option to authorities.
The continued review of all aspects of the project is discussed elsewhere in this chapter, but should equally be referenced in the context of risk management. While important, the management team should be alerted to guarding against the potential paralysis that may result from overemphasis of this safeguard.